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MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY
OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
David Korn, M.D.*
Historians tell us that science arose in the western world under
the moniker of “experimental philosophy” and that, at its birth,
science was inseparably conjoined with integrity. This inseparable
conjunction took root in the fact that experimental philosophy was
an activity exclusively practiced by “gentlemen,” whose word was
deemed their bond and whose devotion to the ideals of loyalty and
honor was considered unshakeable. Quaint though this notion may
now appear, it is instructive to note that, in 1968, some 300 to 400
years later, Stanford University’s then remarkably terse policy on
faculty outside consulting relationships was captured in the
following language:
Most major universities, including Stanford, have taken the
position that consulting relationships are on balance
overwhelmingly beneficial, and there is no disposition to
change that view. At the same time, it would be foolish to
ignore the fact that some of the complications arising from
this state of affairs can cause damage to the university and
to the individual, as well. Chief among these complications
is that tangled and thorny set of problems embraced by the
general title of ‘conflict of interest.’
The issues subsumed under that heading are principally
ethical and as such they are not readily codified to rules of
behavior. In any event, this university has never found it
necessary to spell out the rules or codes of ethics for its
faculty and staff. The relationship between the university
* Senior Vice President, Division of Biomedical and Health Sciences
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and its staff assumes that full-time staff members owe their
primary professional allegiance to the University and that
they will be alert to the possibility that outside obligations,
financial interests, or employment can affect the objectivity
of their decisions as members of the University community.
If those assumptions are valid, as we believe them to be,
then no codes or monitoring devices are needed; if they are
not valid, then none will suffice.1
Certainly, academic science has profoundly changed since the
days of Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton, and profoundly so since
1968, especially in biomedicine. Today neither the organization
nor the culture of science conforms to the trusting, “gentlemanly”
code of behavior captured so sparsely and elegantly in Stanford’s
former policy language. Notwithstanding this reality, I will posit
that the integrity of science today continues to rest fundamentally
on the integrity of individual scientists and their institutions.
Although it is fashionable to think of scientists as “objective,”
“detached,” or “dispassionate,” the truth is that successful
scientists are passionate about their work and often become
committed to particular hypotheses, experimental approaches, and
the correctness of their results. In recognizing this passion, and in
part to respond to it, the scientific processes themselves are
designed to try to protect scientific integrity and mitigate bias.
Among the methods used are peer review, requiring that findings
be communicated with sufficient description of methods, materials,
and data to permit others to attempt to replicate the work, and
caution in the interpretation of data, which are always susceptible
to challenge, modification, refutation, or corroboration.
Replicability plays a particularly important role in confirming the
validity of scientific observations and interpretations.
Problematically, the public and the press too often ignore the fact
that the publication of research, no matter how rigorously peerreviewed, is most assuredly not intended to be an attestation of
verity.
During the past five decades, there has been enormous growth
1

STANFORD UNIVERSITY, RESEARCH POLICY HANDBOOK (1989) (on file
with author).
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of the U.S. scientific enterprise, spurred largely by federal policy
and largesse. Nowhere has this growth been more dramatic than in
the field of biomedicine. Although federal sponsors have
vigorously regulated the expenditures of hundreds of billions of
dollars of research funds, their regulation of the actual conduct of
research and the behaviors of researchers has been astonishingly
light-handed. Thus, during this interval of dramatic growth, the
matter of institutional integrity has become increasingly important.
Indeed, in these matters the government has exhibited remarkable
deference to the cherished autonomy and self-governance of
awardee universities and academic medical centers. Oversight has
been accomplished largely through an “assurance” mechanism,
whereby the awardee institutions assure the federal funders that
they have put appropriate policies and practices in place and, at
least implicitly, are diligent in enforcing them. These assurances
deal with such matters as scientific misconduct, financial conflicts
of interest, and the protection of human research subjects.
The assurance edifice, which in many respects defines the
federal-academic partnership in basic research, is still operational
today. Notably, however, its foundations began to fray in the early
1980s and throughout the 1990s due to a number of unfortunate
and highly publicized episodes that occurred in biomedical
research. These cases, which cast long shadows on the integrity of
biomedical researchers and their institutions, involved flagrant
scientific misconduct. In several of the cases, the perpetrators were
found to have significant financial interests in the outcomes of
their research. Thus, both scientific misconduct and financial
conflicts of interest debuted together on a brightly-lighted public
stage. However, this linkage was unfortunate because it ingrained
in the minds of the public that financial self-interests in biomedical
research are inevitably problematic and likely to lead to scientific
fraud.
During the late 1990s, a number of federal reports criticized
academic medical centers for inadequate compliance with federal
regulations concerning the protection of human research subjects.
Several of those reports raised concerns about financial conflicts of
interest in research institutions, in essence questioning whether the
“institutional watchdog” was still trustworthy. In November 2000,
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the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC)
announced its intention to convene a Task Force on Financial
Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research (AAMC Task Force). It
did so primarily because of the concern that its member
institutions, which conduct more than 60 percent of the total
extramural research funded by the National Institutes of Health
(NIH), had not been sufficiently responsive to the profound
changes that had occurred in the past two decades.2
One can readily identify a number of the most prominent
factors responsible for these changes. First, of course, has been the
extraordinary progress of biomedical science, which has made the
results of even the most fundamental research increasingly
attractive candidates for commercial development and clinical
application. Second was the invention in academia of recombinant
DNA technology, which spawned the biotechnology industry, the
scientific agenda of which continues to be deeply intertwined with
academic biomedical research and researchers. The invention of
recombinant DNA technology by Professors Cohen (Stanford) and
Boyer (UCSF) in the early 1970s is well known, as is the deep
intertwining of academic biomedical and biotech industry research.
A third factor was the 1980 case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a recombinant
bacterium was patentable subject matter.3 The Court stated in its
opinion that “anything under the sun” invented by man is
patentable.4 By sweeping living organisms under the reach of
patentability, the Court deemed a vast expanse of biomedical
research and technology eligible for intellectual property
protection, an expanse whose boundaries continue to expand and
be hotly contested to this day. A fourth factor was the enactment of
the Bayh-Dole Act, also in 1980, which gives the recipients of
federal research funds both the right to patent their discoveries and
the obligation to spur translation of those discoveries into public
benefit, that is, to stimulate the commercialization of federally-

2
3
4

I like to refer to this period as the ecology of biomedical research.
447 U.S. 303 (1980).
Id. at 309 (internal citations omitted).
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funded research results.5
Yet another factor has been the storied accomplishments of
Silicon Valley, MA Route 128, and the San Francisco Bay Area in
informatics and biotechnology. These successes have reached nearmythic proportions in the minds of local, state, and federal
politicians—all of them eager to bring similar bounties to their
communities through the commercialization of university research.
Thus, America’s research universities have become increasingly
viewed as “engines of economic development” and have found
themselves ensnarled in a tangled web of intensely conflicted
political pressures and public expectations.
As a consequence of all of these factors, the breadth, depth, and
intensity of interaction between universities and their biomedical
research staff and industry has increased dramatically, as has the
prevalence of individual and institutional financial self-interest in
academic biomedical research. Some alarmed observers have
opined that science is facing a veritable pandemic of financial
conflicts of interest; others have questioned whether academia is
busily bartering its very soul for the prospect of material
enrichment.
In response to these concerns, AAMC convened a Task Force
5

Government Patent Policy Act of 1980 (Bayh-Dole Act), 35 USC §§ 200211 (2004). The Act provides in relevant part:
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to
promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported
research or development; to encourage maximum participation of small
business firms in federally supported research and development efforts;
to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit
organizations, including universities; to ensure that inventions made by
nonprofit organizations and small business firms are used in a manner
to promote free competition and enterprise without unduly
encumbering future research and discovery; to promote the
commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the
United States by United States industry and labor; to ensure that the
Government obtains sufficient rights in federally supported inventions
to meet the needs of the Government and protect the public against
nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions; and to minimize the costs of
administering policies in this area.
Id. § 200.
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that produced two reports that address individual and institutional
financial self-interests, respectively.6 The reports are noteworthy in
that they reflect the hard-won consensus of a highly diverse group
of leaders representing all of the stakeholder groups, including
academia, industry, bioethics, law, patients, and media
representatives. The reports offer principles, recommendations,
and guidelines that are stringent and challenging. They would hold
academic medical centers to high standards that the AAMC
believes would contribute greatly to buttressing public confidence
in the integrity and trustworthiness of academic medical centers
and the research they produce.
The AAMC recently reported the results of a year-long survey
study that it conducted to assess the current state of financial
conflict of interest policies at U.S. medical schools.7 The
participation of 82 percent of the schools makes this study the most
comprehensive exploration of this topic to date. The report
indicates that the medical schools and their parent universities have
made encouraging progress in revising and strengthening their
policies and practices in accordance with the recommendations of
the AAMC Task Force.8 At the same time, however, the study
reveals many areas in which continued effort is necessary to ensure
that all medical schools engaged in clinical research on human
subjects maintain a consistently high standard of disclosure of
financial self-interests. For example, the schools must continue to
press for the adoption and credible application of the “compelling
circumstances” threshold regarding the permitted participation of
financially-conflicted scientists in clinical research, and for
6

See ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, PROTECTING
SUBJECTS, PRESERVING TRUST, PROMOTING PROGRESS (2001), available at
http://www.aamc.org/members/coitf/firstreport.pdf [hereinafter REPORT I];
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES (2002), PROTECTING
SUBJECTS, PRESERVING TRUST, PROMOTING PROGRESS II, available at
http://www.aamc.org/members/coitf/2002coireport.pdf [hereinafter REPORT II].
7
SUSAN EHRINGHAUS & DAVID KORN, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICAL COLLEGES, U.S. MEDICAL SCHOOL POLICIES ON INDIVIDUAL
FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (2004), available at http://www.aamc.org/
members/coitf/coiresults2003.pdf.
8
Id. at 5-6.
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rigorous management to ensure that financial interests are never
allowed to compromise the integrity of the research or the welfare
of the human subjects.9
The AAMC has devoted considerable attention to the matter of
financial conflicts of interest during the past fifteen years because
of its conviction that academic medicine should demonstrate strong
and unambiguous moral leadership in biomedical research (and
medical practice, for that matter) to remain worthy of the
remarkable trust and esteem placed in it by the American public.
To this point, there persists a major area of concern that has
troubled some academic medical leaders and journal editors for
many years and, in recent months, has become the focus of
enormous public attention and alarm—the integrity of reporting of
the results of industry-sponsored clinical trials. Although the
principal targets of concern are pharmaceutical companies and,
regrettably, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), academic
medicine is also implicated because so many influential clinical
trials are conducted by academic specialists of high repute. These
“thought leaders” bring to the trial, and especially to the
publication of trial results in prestigious medical journals, not only
their expertise but also their credibility as academics.
Although this interaction between academic medical experts
and industry is scientifically and clinically understandable, and
indeed may be necessary for a successful study, serious concerns
have been raised about just how involved the academic principal
investigators really may be in such critically important tasks as the
design of the trial, primary data analysis and interpretation, and
even at times the writing of the paper itself. In other words, too
many documented instances suggest that academic leaders
sometimes permit themselves to be used to provide cover and
respectability to industry-sponsored studies in return for potentially
rich financial rewards. It is worth emphasizing that the AAMC
Task Force reports urge medical schools and teaching hospitals to
9

Id. at 6-7. The Task Force argued that a financially-conflicted investigator
should be permitted to participate in clinical research only in the presence of
“compelling circumstances.” Id. at 3. Although the Task Force declined to
define “compelling,” it believed that a useful standard would be that the research
in question could not be carried out as effectively or safely by anyone else. Id.
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adopt a strong posture against permitting such financiallyconflicted practices.10
The present crisis of credibility is due in part to company
sponsors ignoring or suppressing the publication of negative trial
results and choosing instead to publish positive results, thereby
presenting to practicing physicians and the public a highly
misleading picture of the efficacy and safety of the drugs in
question. Questions have even been raised about whether the FDA
itself, presumably under industry pressure, has been guilty of such
suppression of negative data. Given the FDA’s statutory role as the
federal watchdog over the purity, safety, and efficacy of nearly 25
percent of the gross national product of the United States, such
allegations are extremely troubling. As a result, several state
attorneys general, especially New York Attorney General Elliott
Spitzer, have played a major role in bringing these grievous
matters to light by filing charges of criminal fraud, exacting high
financial penalties, and imposing corrective practices on the
accused company perpetrators.
The present crisis, which focused initially on the use of heavily
marketed anti-depressant drugs in children and, more recently, on
the purported efficacy and safety of new generation antiinflammatory drugs (“cox-II inhibitors”), has created great
pressure for the establishment of a federally funded and operated
mandatory registry of all clinical trials. Although the
implementation of such a registry is not so simple a task as the
media and some congresspersons would like to believe, both the
AAMC and the American Medical Association (AMA) have lent
their strong endorsements to this initiative.
Two facts are often overlooked in public discussions of
financial conflicts of interest in biomedical research. First, the
extraordinarily generous public investment in biomedical research
in the post-World War II decades has not been driven by scientific
curiosity or the abstract goal of enriching scientific knowledge.
Rather, that investment has been driven by the hope and
expectation that diseases will be better understood, that preventive
and therapeutic interventions will be more rational and effective,
10

See REPORT I & REPORT II supra note 6.
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and that from all of this will come dramatic reductions in suffering
and improvements in the public health. Second, in our political
economy, which frowns on “industrial planning,” the commercial
development of scientific discoveries is, with the singular
exception of the defense industry, almost exclusively dependent on
private capital. It is important to keep in mind that the NIH
research dollar, with precious few exceptions, stops at discovery;
therefore, partnering among academic institutions, venture capital,
and industry is an inevitable and necessary step in bringing the
fruits of biomedical research to market.
Given these facts, the challenge for the academic medical
community is to oversee and manage the inevitable financial selfinterests with stringent policies, scrupulous practices, and a strong
presumption against permitting a financially-conflicted
investigator to participate in clinical research on human subjects,
unless a compelling case can be made that the research could not
be performed as effectively or as safely by anyone else.
Compelling circumstances do indeed exist; nonetheless, the broad
acceptance of such a standard would dramatically reduce the
number of instances in which such practices occur as well as the
unfortunate misbehaviors that too often result. With that said,
proposers of new remedies that call for the blanket elimination of
financial conflicts of interest should take care that, in their zeal to
attain some idealized state of virtue, they do not interdict a robust
developmental pathway of immense social benefit and
coincidentally kill the goose that lays the golden egg that supports
biomedical research discovery and its realization for public benefit.

